The agency intends to use this software to more effectively track its increasing number of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), which are vital for investigating accidents. The NTSB does not have a centralized system for tracking its drones, which are used to capture video and photos of incidents and perform mapping and photogrammetry.

In its posting, the NTSB notes that, until recently, its UAS program has been operated on a small scale, with just five drones, four active crewmembers, and one program lead. Documentation of fleet assets and personnel was managed manually through basic spreadsheets and databases, a process the agency described as “archaic” and “inefficient,” making it difficult to maintain a robust safety management system.

The NTSB said it has recently launched its UAS Flight Operations program—expanding its aircraft fleet from five to 12 drones—and has increased personnel to a team of 15.

“Implementation of a solution for both aircraft and program management will serve to improve the effectiveness and integrity of NTSB investigations,” the agency said.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post NTSB Working to Streamline Drone Program appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

These words from the transcript of audio recordings of the air boss and airshow participant testimony gathered by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have shed new light on the fatal midair collision of a Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress, known as Texas Raiders, and a Bell P-63F Kingcobra at the Wings Over Dallas airshow on November 12, 2022. 

All five aboard the B-17 and the pilot of the P-63 were killed when the fighter aircraft sliced into the bomber, severing the tail.

Both aircraft were registered to the American Airpower Heritage Museum and part of the Dallas-based Commemorative Air Force (CAF), a nonprofit organization dedicated to preserving and showing historical aircraft. The pilots were CAF volunteers.

• READ MORE: NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Fatal Texas Midair Collision

NTSB’s docket contains more than 1,900 pages of “factual information, including reports on operations and human performance factors, airplane performance, airworthiness, and laboratory examinations.” This information is now available to the public, although the investigation is still ongoing.

The midair collision occurred in front of thousands and was captured on video and in photographs. The NTSB has included much of this information in the docket, along with transcripts of recordings and interviews with CAF volunteer pilots, many of whom were flying that day and witnessed the collision from the air. 

The docket provides insight into the machinations that it takes to put on an airshow. It is documented that the flying is “scripted,” and great care is usually taken to keep separation from all aircraft.

Video of the event at Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD) shows the aircraft were flying on a northerly heading parallel to Runway 31 as part of the parade of planes. The P-63F was third in a three-ship formation of fighters, and the B-17G was lead of a five-ship formation of bombers.

Among the photos compiled by NTSB is one taken from a ground camera that shows the B-17 and P-63 flying toward the camera. The aircraft appear to be at the same altitude, and the P-63 is in a left bank with its belly facing the bomber. This would make it impossible for the pilot of the P-63 to see the larger aircraft.

According to the NTSB preliminary investigation, there were two show lines—one 500 feet from the audience, the other 1,000 feet away. Show lines are established at airshows to keep aircraft from flying directly over the crowd.

According to CAF pilots interviewed, normal procedure is for the pursuit aircraft—also known as fighters—to be flying several hundred feet above the bombers “flying cover.” The bombers fly at a lower altitude in a trail of about a quarter of a mile behind each other.

In more than 500 pages of interview transcripts, pilots told investigators that they were encouraged to voice concerns if they saw a practice or action that they believed to be too risky in the air. The clear message was that as the flying was scripted, meaning the pilots knew the altitudes and positions they were to be flying before they left the ground. During the pre-show briefing, pilots took extensive notes and referred to them during flight.

It is the duty of the air boss to make sure there are no altitude or air space conflicts.

The air boss for Wings Over Dallas was Russell Royce. According to the docket, Royce has worked as an air boss for approximately 20 years.

When asked how he intended to ensure separation as the fighters crossed the flight path of the bombers to get on the 500-foot line as you directed, Royce told NTSB investigators, “They shouldn’t have been there. We do it all the time…It’s never a problem. I never saw the P-63 roll in.”

The NTSB preliminary accident report noted there was no altitude deconfliction briefed before the flight or while the airplanes were in the air. Altitude deconfliction procedures are established in the event pilots find themselves at an improper altitude during the flight.

For those who have ever wondered about how much coordination is required to execute an airshow, the docket is very educational. Hundreds have to work together under the guidance of the air boss.

• READ MORE: Commemorative Air Force Faces Lawsuit in Fatal Midair Collision

Aftermath

According to the recorded audio of the airshow radio transmissions, Royce directed both the fighters and bombers to maneuver southwest of the runway before returning to the flying display area, which was the designated performance area. ADS-B data shows the aircraft complied.

Royce then directed the fighter formation to transition to a trail formation and fly in front of the bombers, then proceed near the 500-foot show line.

The bombers were directed to fly the 1,000-foot show line. In the final transmission before the moment of impact, Royce can be heard saying, “Nice job, fighters. Come on through. Fighters will be a big pullup and to the right.”

The accident happened around 1:22 p.m. in front of thousands of spectators. The collision was captured on multiple smartphones from multiple angles, and these videos and still photos were quickly posted to social media. The images show the P-63F in pieces, raining down on the grassy area on airport property south of the approach end of Runway 31 and the B-17G forward section tumbling forward in a ball of fire. Captured stills of the accident appear to show the copilot of the B-17 holding on to the roof as the forward section of the aircraft cartwheels to the ground.

No injuries were reported on the ground.

Several pilots described witnessing the impact from the air. Some of the most disturbing testimony comes from the crew aboard the B-24 that was flying behind the B-17. As noted by the NTSB investigator conducting the interview, the B-24 crew had a “bird’s-eye view” of the collision and the separation of the B-17 tail and subsequent fireball and crash of the forward section.

The pilots noted that after witnessing the event they were rattled and took special care to focus on the procedures that had been briefed for emergency operations and the checklists for their respective airplanes. There was discussion about appropriate airports to divert to, keeping in mind the needs of the heavier aircraft that require longer runways than most GA trainers.

The docket, while extensive, does not offer any conclusions about “how or why the crash happened.” The NTSB will issue a final report at a later date that “will include analysis, findings, recommendations, and probable cause determinations related to the accident.”

The public docket for this investigation is available here.  Additional material may be added to the docket as it becomes available. NTSB’s preliminary report, along with a link to photos and other information, may be found here. 

The post NTSB Releases Docket for Fatal Wings Over Dallas Airshow Midair appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The catastrophe was recorded by a number of surveillance cameras, some located not far from the point of impact. Video showed the airplane airborne, initially drifting left, then yawing left to an extreme sideslip angle before rapidly rolling into an inverted dive. The sequence took just a few seconds. Once the left wing had dropped, the low altitude made recovery impossible.

The crew had not reported any trouble to the tower. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators reconstructed the event by analyzing surveillance videos and the sound spectrum of the engines captured as background noise by the cockpit voice recorder, as well as extracting data from the airplane’s ADS-B and terrain awareness warning systems. They concluded the critical left engine had spooled down for some reason, and the pilot had reacted by pressing on the left rudder pedal rather than the right. Only the combination of asymmetric thrust with added rudder, the NTSB found, could bring the airplane to the extreme yaw angle observed in the videos, as asymmetric thrust alone would not have been sufficient.

The only communications between the two pilots recorded during the accident sequence were an exclamation of “What in the world?” by the pilot flying and the copilot’s statement, three and a half seconds later, that “You just lost your left engine.” (The King Air is a single-pilot airplane. The copilot frequently flew with the pilot to gain experience, but was not permitted to touch the controls when passengers were aboard.)

The NTSB suspected the spooldown of the left engine might have been caused by a faulty friction setting on the left power lever, which could have allowed it to creep backward during the takeoff roll. This is a known susceptibility of King Airs; the power levers are spring-loaded toward idle, each has its own friction knob, and they rely on positive friction to keep them from drifting. The power quadrant was too badly damaged in the post-crash fire to allow investigators to tell anything about the position of the left power lever or the friction settings. Uncommanded power rollbacks on the PT6-series engines can have other causes, however, which would not necessarily be detectable in a severely burned wreckage, and so the attribution to the friction setting remained speculative.

The quadrant frictions are a checklist item, but the CVR recording disclosed no pre-takeoff briefing and none of the expected checklist or V-speed callouts. According to other pilots who had flown with him, the pilot, 71, a 16,450-hour ATP, was “not strong on using checklists” and “just jumped in the airplane and went.” He was, on the other hand, “super strong” on knowledge of the airplane, in which he had logged 1,100 hours. According to the pilot who administered his most recent proficiency check, he had performed well on the simulated engine failure on takeoff. The check ride took place in the airplane, however, not in a simulator, and so as a safety precaution the engine cut, which had been briefed in advance, did not occur until the airplane was safely airborne and climbing. A successful performance under such controlled circumstances did not guarantee success in exigent ones.

The NTSB’s reconstruction of the takeoff showed the pilot had rotated at 102 kias, slightly below the V1 (go/abort) speed of 106 kias and 8 knots below the calculated rotation speed of 110 knots. The airplane was fully airborne at 106 kias and was at around 110 kias when the power began to roll back. The airplane drifted left, reaching a maximum altitude of 100 feet. Three seconds later, it was at 70 feet and the airspeed was 85 knots. One second later, it plunged through the hangar roof.

The standard procedure for loss of an engine in the King Air 350 is to establish a positive rate of climb with a pitch angle of 10 degrees, retract the landing gear, and feather the propeller on the inoperative engine while maintaining V2 (minimum safe climb speed with an engine out) to 400 feet agl. Above 400 feet, the airplane is allowed to accelerate, the flaps are retracted, and the climb continues at 125 kias.

None of this happened, however, because the pilot, in spite of his lifetime of flying experience and countless successful proficiency checks, stepped on the wrong rudder pedal.

• READ MORE: Objection Overruled

There was a time when the NTSB often cited fatigue as a contributing factor in accidents, but at some point it must have become obvious that plenty of well-rested pilots crashed too, so unless a pilot literally fell asleep at the wheel, fatigue could never be proved to have been a link in a causal chain. In this case, the pilot had a history of severe sleep apnea. To the extent that the FAA was aware of it, the agency had taken no action, although in principle the condition could have been disqualifying. The NTSB turned its back on this opportunity to invoke fatigue. “No evidence,” the agency wrote, “indicates that the pilot’s medical conditions or their treatment were factors in the accident.”

I would have expected the NTSB’s finding of “probable cause” to be something like “…the pilot’s inappropriate reaction to a loss of power in the left engine, which resulted in loss of control.” Instead, it blamed “the pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control,” which seems rather vague and generic. Among the contributing factors, “failure to conduct the airplane manufacturer’s emergency procedure” is a little misleading, since he did begin to execute the procedure but bungled it. The agency added his “failure…to follow the manufacturer’s checklists during all phases of operation,” even though the only link between checklists and the crash was the hypothetical faulty friction setting for which there was no material evidence. Two King Air pilots with whom I discussed the accident were skeptical of the friction theory because they said matching torques on two PT6s during takeoff involves enough fiddling with the power levers that it would be impossible for the pilot to be unaware of a sloppy-feeling lever.

I suspect the NTSB wanted to blame the accident on the pilot not being a by-the-book kind of person. None of his associates the NTSB interviewed suggested he was reckless or incompetent—quite the opposite. The problem with pinning the accident on a personality trait of the pilot is that the mistake of stepping on the wrong rudder pedal is not connected in any obvious way to that. It seems more like one of those random human mistakes we all sometimes make—but hope we will never make at a critical moment.

Note: This article is based on the National Transportation Safety Board’s report of the accident and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention. It is not intended to judge or reach any definitive conclusions about the ability or capacity of any person, living or dead, or any aircraft or accessory.

This column first appeared in the August 2023/Issue 940 print edition of FLYING.

The post King Air 350 Accident Proved to Be Fatal Misstep appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

In this episode of Aviation Consumer Live, Aviation Consumer’s Larry Anglisano and Rick Durden talk about some recent reports (and some older ones, too) they studied in the Used Aircraft Guide and offer some tips on what you should and shouldn’t do if you break an aircraft.

Want more? Look for the Stupid Pilot Tricks annual feature in the January 2024 issue of sister publication IFR Magazine.

Editor’s Note: This video was produced by Aviation Consumer magazine.

The post Used Aircraft Guide Live: Wrecks Revisited appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

During a flight from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (KEVB) in Florida to Ridgeland, the aircraft’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded information indicating that the pilot in command (PIC) wanted to complete the flight as quickly as possible and arrive at the destination airport ahead of another aircraft.

According to the NTSB report, a passenger asked the crewmembers about the estimated time of arrival, and the PIC replied, “I’ll speed up. I’ll go real fast here.” A minute or so later, the second in command (SIC) noted the airplane’s airspeed was 300 knots and its altitude was 9,000 feet. For the next few minutes, the crew talked about ways to shorten the flight time, the report said. The pilots also noted that another jet on the radio was headed to 3J1.

The PIC said the other aircraft’s estimated arrival time was 10:33, local time or about two minutes ahead of the eventual accident aircraft. The CVR recorded the PIC commenting that the other jet would “slow to 250 [knots] below 10 [thousand feet] and we won’t. We know what we’re doing right now. We’re trying to win a race.” The SIC can be heard replying, “That’s right,” and the PIC said, “This is NASCAR,” after which laughter can be heard on the recording.

At Ridgeland, the crew performed a straight-in visual approach to land on Runway 36. The airplane was high and fast throughout the final approach “as evidenced by the SIC’s airspeed callouts,” per the NTSB report. The SIC asked if S-turns were necessary, and the PIC replied that they were not.

The CVR recorded an electronic voice giving repeated “sink rate” and “pull-up” warnings during the final approach, indicating the approach was not stable. The pilots continued the landing, touching down about 1,000 feet down the 4,200-foot runway. The airplane failed to stop in time, overran the runway, and came to rest in a marshy area about 400 feet beyond the departure end. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage, according to the NTSB.

The PIC later said the airplane’s wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and ground air brakes did not function after touchdown, but evidence from witnesses and video indicated the thrust reversers deployed shortly after touchdown. Tire skid marks indicated that wheel braking “occurred throughout the ground roll,” the report said. NTSA said the ground air brakes did not deploy, and tests performed to determine why were inconclusive.

The NTSB said the probable cause of the accident was “the flight crew’s continuation of an unstable approach and the failure of the ground air brakes to deploy upon touchdown, both of which resulted in the runway overrun. Contributing was the crew’s motivation and response to external pressures to complete the flight as quickly as possible to accommodate passenger wishes and the crew’s decision to land with a quartering tailwind that exceeded the airplane’s limitations.”

The post NTSB: Rushed Flight Contributed to Gulfstream G150 Runway Overrun appeared first on FLYING Magazine.