Both Quisenberry and flight instructor Timothy McKellar Jr., 22, were killed when their Piper PA-28-161 was ripped apart in a thunderstorm during a night flight.

The suit names Eagle Flight Academy, where both Quisenberry and McKellar had done their primary flight training, along with ATP Flight Center, where McKellar earned his instructor certificate. 

The 28-page complaint filed this week by Ransdell Roach & Royse PLLC of Lexington, Kentucky, documented the events that led up to the ill-fated flight on September 27, 2023.

Quisenberry, 18, had been flying with Eagle Flight Academy since April 2022. According to the lawsuit, the majority of Quisenberry’s training was done with CFI Ronnie Bunn.

According to McKellar’s social media posts in 2020, he also trained at Eagle Flight Academy, and Bunn was also his instructor in October of that year when he did his first solo. 

McKellar completed his training at ATP in Indiana, earning his instructor certificate in May 2023. On his social media pages, McKellar listed himself as an instructor pilot for ATP.

According to the lawsuit, however, “McKellar was employed by ATP for a brief period as a CFI but despite having been trained and certified at ATP Louisville Flight School, he was discharged from employment by ATP due to unsatisfactory performance as a CFI.”

The night cross-country flight was the first time Quisenberry flew with McKellar. According to the Quisenberry family, Bunn is colorblind, therefore he could not act as pilot in command (PIC) on a night flight.

The plan was to fly from Owensboro-Daviess County Regional Airport (KOWB) to Bowling Green-Woodhurst Airport (KBWG) in Kentucky.

McKellar documented the night flight through a series of photos and videos, posting to his Snapchat account. The posts began with McKellar on camera, shaking his head with the caption, “me and this student should not get along if he was my full-time student. I’ve seen faster at the Special Olympics.”

The video then flipped around to show Quisenberry, checklist in hand as he performed the preflight inspection of the aircraft in the dark, while McKellar drummed his fingers on the fuselage of the plane.

There were more posts during the flight with McKellar referring to Quisenberry as “Forrest Gump Jr.” and “not being the sharpest tool in the shed.” These posts went viral and are included in the complaint.

The forecast for the area that night indicated the probability of thunderstorms. According to FlightAware, the aircraft reached Bowling Green and made multiple circuits in the pattern then headed back toward Owensboro.

McKellar posted a Snapchat of the aircraft’s flight path and the approaching weather, commenting that thunderstorms were heading toward them “like pissed-off hornets.”

NTSB Investigation

According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) preliminary accident report, the aircraft flew through “heavy to extreme precipitation” shortly after the final Snapchat entry was posted.

McKellar requested an IFR clearance and control gave them a heading to fly. McKellar responded that they were getting “blown around like crazy,” and the aircraft was in “extreme turbulence.”

The complaint noted that the aircraft appeared to be flying in circles before radio contact was lost.

The next morning the wreckage was found spread out over 25 acres of hilly terrain. The aircraft, per the NTSB, was missing its left wing. The bodies of both men were recovered.

The NTSB investigation is still underway and the agency has not released a final report on the cause of the accident.

Prior Knowledge?

The lawsuit alleges that Eagle Flight Academy and ATP knew about McKellar’s deficiencies as an instructor but “did not take adequate remedial actions” to address them.

Following the 2023 crash, FLYING made multiple attempts to reach Eagle Flight Academy and its owner, Wilford Voyles Jr., but calls and emails were not returned. The flight school closed in December 2023. ATP did not respond to FLYING’s request for comment.

The lawsuit asks for a jury trial as the family of Quisenberry are seeking to recover the cost of funeral expenses and other unspecified damages.

In interviews with Spectrum News 1 Kentucky, the Quisensberrys noted that the derogatory social media posts made by McKellar were very much a catalyst in their decision to file the lawsuit.

The post Family Sues After Student Pilot Killed in Kentucky Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The agency intends to use this software to more effectively track its increasing number of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), which are vital for investigating accidents. The NTSB does not have a centralized system for tracking its drones, which are used to capture video and photos of incidents and perform mapping and photogrammetry.

In its posting, the NTSB notes that, until recently, its UAS program has been operated on a small scale, with just five drones, four active crewmembers, and one program lead. Documentation of fleet assets and personnel was managed manually through basic spreadsheets and databases, a process the agency described as “archaic” and “inefficient,” making it difficult to maintain a robust safety management system.

The NTSB said it has recently launched its UAS Flight Operations program—expanding its aircraft fleet from five to 12 drones—and has increased personnel to a team of 15.

“Implementation of a solution for both aircraft and program management will serve to improve the effectiveness and integrity of NTSB investigations,” the agency said.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post NTSB Working to Streamline Drone Program appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Three miles out from the airport, the pilot of the C-340A announced he was doing a straight-in. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the larger, faster airplane was not configured for landing as its approach speed was 180 knots. The published flap extension speed for the C-340A is 160 knots, and the landing gear extension speed is 140 knots.

Muscle memory, checklist use, and procedures often go hand in hand. Had the pilot of the C-340A flown the traffic pattern for the airport beginning with maneuvering for 45-degree angle entry on to the downwind at midfield, he might have remembered to slow down the airplane and configure it for landing.

NTSB reports are full of similar but thankfully mostly non-fatal events that can occur when the pilot on a straight-in forgets the landing gear—often at a non-towered airport. 

At a towered airport, the controllers often contact the pilot and advise them that their gear is not down with a simple “check gear” query. NTSB investigations into gear-up landings often include a statement from the pilot, who note that the straight-in, devoid of the usual cues such as turning on to the 45 or downwind, resulted in forgetting to run the checklist, which included the action of lowering the landing gear with the phrase “gear down and locked.”

Many instructors, myself included, advocate for at least three gear checks: downwind, base, and final. In the faster aircraft such as a twin, the landing gear is often deployed on the 45 as a means to help slow down the aircraft.

In a fixed-gear airplane you don’t have to worry about the landing gear position, but checking the position of the gear if possible (like looking out the window in the high wing aircraft) is a good habit.

Verbalizing the checklist on each leg of the pattern is also a good habit. There may be things that are “deferred,” such as putting the propeller to full as one does on final in a complex airplane to facilitate a go-around if needed.

My U.S. Air Force Academy-trained instructor beat this into me—and recitation had to end with “check list complete” in my authoritative pilot voice.

On a straight-in approach, you miss the cues for aircraft configuration changes, such as power reduction and addition of flaps.

Here’s a teachable moment: dropping all the flaps at once can potentially bend metal if the aircraft is outside of V_FE, and will trigger a pitch change that catches many novice pilots by surprise. The natural reaction is to take all the flaps out in one movement, which makes the bad situation worse.

I demonstrate this to the learner at an appropriate altitude and at a flap-friendly speed in the practice area just so they know what it feels like and what it does to the airplane and why it is not something you want to mess with when you are close to the ground.

We then discuss how the incremental deployment of flaps prevents the pitch surprise, as does following the prelanding checklist on each leg of the pattern to achieve the published speeds for each leg as recommended by the manufacturer.

Poor Approach, Poor Landing

One of the first lessons to be taught to the novice pilot is that a poor approach results in a poor landing. If you are behind the airplane, as in slow to reduce throttle, start the descent, deploy flaps, that landing will be ugly. This can happen during straight in approaches as the legs of the pattern are a reminder to the pilot to run the checklist and reconfigure the aircraft.  Instead, the pilot relies on experience and knowledge of the aircraft performance to determine when to do configuration changes. This experience is best gained with a seasoned CFI next to you and flown in an appropriate environment, like at a towered airport when the pilot requests and ATC grants a straight-in approach.

Straight-ins at non-towered airports are especially dangerous as we learned by the Watsonville collision. When an aircraft comes bombing into a pattern already occupied by other aircraft, it is very much like running a red light. There may be someone closer than you think on a collision course. You can’t slam the brakes on an airplane in the air. Entering the pattern on the 45 at pattern altitude provides better situational awareness as it gives the pilot more of an opportunity to scan for traffic, see and avoid it.

It is for this reason many instructors discourage their learners from doing straight-in approaches. While I agree they are not a good idea at a non-controlled airport, they should be, at the very least, briefed and the scenario flown in the practice area so the learner knows when to refer to the checklist, when to reduce power, when to lower the flaps, etc.

Outside a request from a tower, there are times when a straight-in is called for, such as when a magneto fails a few miles outside the traffic pattern and the airport is the closest suitable runway.

This is the scenario I use with my learners, as I experienced it in the real world as a learner. My CFI demonstrated the proper technique, troubleshooting the issue to no avail, calling my attention to the diminished engine power available and sight picture, and ensuring that we had the runway made before applying flaps and reducing the power to idle.

Many years later, I was the CFI and had this happen. The straight-in and landing was a nonevent. The chief mechanic brought me fragments of metal that had been the left magneto to show my ground school class.

Another scenario where a straight-in is appropriate is when the weather that was VFR or MVFR drops to IFR and you, the noninstrument-rated pilot in the non-IFR-equipped aircraft need to get down quickly.

Don’t Be That Pilot

There are pilots who, when they hear another pilot on the radio state they are planning to do a straight-in approach, will scold the pilot or even threaten to call the FAA on them. This is not a discussion to have on the radio.

I have witnessed this at nontowered airports. I tell my learners not to engage that person. Focus on flying the airplane. If you are the pilot doing the straight-in for any of the above mentioned reasons—weather, a mechanical issue, or perhaps even an airsick passenger that necessitates getting on the ground quickly but not declaring an emergency—wait until you get on the ground before you get into a “discussion” with the other pilot. 

The post Why Straight-In Approaches Aren’t So Straightforward appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

SA-097 emphasized that “as little as 1/4-inch of wing-leading edge ice accumulation can increase the stall speed by 25 to 40 knots and cause sudden departure from controlled flight.”

The alert also warned that ice buildup on pitot tubes can lead to instrument failure, impacting readings for airspeed, altitude, and vertical speed.

The NTSB acknowledged that some pilots have been taught to wait for a certain amount of ice to accumulate on the leading edges before using deice boots due to concerns about ice bridging. However, the FAA’s recent tests show that modern deicing boots, from aircraft manufactured after 1960, are not prone to ice bridging.

The agency warned that performance issues may arise if deice boots are not engaged promptly when icing begins and advises pilots to refer to their operating handbooks for specific procedures on boot activation and use.

The alert also cited several accidents where failure to follow operating handbook instructions led to in-flight loss of control, underscoring the critical importance of adhering to recommended deicing practices.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

The post NTSB Issues Deicing Safety Alert appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The wing of an Airbus A350 struck the tail of Endeavor Bombardier CRJ-900, shearing it off. 

The CRJ-900 was operated by Endeavor Air, a Delta subsidiary, according to AirlineGeeks.com.

According to a spokesperson from Delta, the Airbus was taxiing out when it made contact with the smaller jet on an adjacent runway, “resulting in damage to the tail of the regional jet and the wing of the A350.”

The impact “resulted in the vertical and horizontal stabilizer of the CRJ being severed from the aircraft,” a spokesperson from the FAA told FLYING. The agency, along with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), is investigating the accident.

No injuries were reported on either flight. The Airbus, which was en route as DL295 to Tokyo-Haneda Airport (RJTT) had 221 on board while the CRJ-900 headed to Lafayette, Louisiana, had 56 on board. Both aircraft returned to the terminal and the customers rebooked on other flights.

Photographs on social media show the tail of the CRJ900 torn from its vertical position and laying across the empennage of the aircraft.

The post Delta Jets Damaged After Collision on Taxiway in Atlanta appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The agency has released Safety Alert SA091, which warns pilots to train for partial as well as full power loss in multiengine piston aircraft.

According to the NTSB,  the safety alert was issued because of recent significant multiengine accidents attributed to a loss of control stemming from the pilots’ failure to properly manage the propeller on the engine that lost power.

The problem, according to the NTSB alert, is that there is a gap between training for full engine power loss and partial loss, as pilots can improperly manage a partial loss of power leading to an increased risk of loss of control.

“Constant-speed, manually feathering propellers on multiengine aircraft are equipped with mechanisms called start locks that keep propeller blades from going into feather position during a normal engine shutdown on the ground, thus making it easier to start the engine with the propeller blades at a low pitch blade angle,” NTSB said. “These locks’ centrifugal latches disengage when the propeller is spinning above a certain rpm. However, start locks can engage in flight if the propeller’s rpm drops below this critical threshold.”

Chapter 13 of the FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3C) outlines multiengine operations: “In a multiengine airplane, loss of thrust from one engine affects both performance and control. The most obvious problem is the loss of 50 percent of power, which reduces climb performance 80 to 90 percent.” 

The loss of engine power on one side creates asymmetrical thrust, similar to the way a rowboat with one of the oars turned sideways results in asymmetrical thrust.

When held so the large flat part of the oar is facing forward and moved through the water, the oar can generate a lot of forward motion (thrust). But if one of the oars remains static and in the water while the other continues to generate thrust, the rowboat can go out of control because the nonmoving oar is generating drag. Rotating the nonmoving oar so the thin side of the oar is facing forward creates feathering and the lowest profile into the water. In the case of the aircraft, the relative wind generates less drag, allowing for more controllability.

The NTSB noted that while feathering the propeller of an engine that has lost power is a recommended practice, pilots are reminded that once the propeller rpm decreases below the speed at which the start locks engage, the pilot will not be able to feather the propeller, which can lead to drag that results a loss of control.

The safety alert reminded pilots that twin-engine aircraft certified under Part 23 are not required to provide a positive climb rate with one engine inoperative, although they do have a published “minimum controllable airspeed.”

“Because the minimum control speed for an airplane with one engine inoperative is determined with the propeller windmilling, timely feathering increases your controllability margin beyond certificated performance,” the safety alert said.

During training, multiengine pilots are warned that single-engine operations consist of maintaining aircraft control and attempting to troubleshoot and restore engine power while simultaneously drifting down toward an emergency landing site because very few light twin trainers can climb on one engine.

Several accidents have been attributed to a loss of control due to the start locks engaging before the propeller could be placed into feather, resulting in a loss of control, NTSB said.

The NTSB recommended pilots review and practice manufacturer procedures for engine failure, including partial power loss in addition to complete engine failure. Pilots should know the rpm below which feathering the propeller is not possible.

Engine power loss scenarios should be practiced in the air or in simulator training sessions so that the pilot’s actions will be correct and timely.

When conducting pre-takeoff checks, the pilot should be sure all engine controls, including the propeller feathering mechanisms, are functioning normally.

Pilots should discuss and brief what procedures to follow when there is a loss of engine power at a particular phase of flight, such as shortly after takeoff when the landing gear has been retracted or when the aircraft is in cruise above 3,000 feet or on approach.

And don’t forget the multiengine pilot’s mantra during engine power loss—”identify, verify, fix or feather.” That means determining which engine has lost power, noting the nose yaws toward the the sick engine, verifying this theory by adjusting the throttle and looking at the gauges; fixing the issue by switching fuel tanks if able; and feathering the propeller to cut down on drag and maintain controllability.

The post NTSB Issues Warning of Prop Lock Out on Multiengine Aircraft appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The pilot of the 1943 Boeing-Stearman PT-17 Kaydet, 72-year-old Christopher M. Paulson, was seriously injured. Passenger Jed Paul Kelly, 45, was found dead in the wreckage. 

Photographs of the accident site taken by the Skamania County Sheriff’s Office show the yellow and gray aircraft inverted and in a nose-down attitude in heavily wooded terrain.

What Happened

According to the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), the Kaydet departed from the Enumclaw, Washington, area Friday morning en route to the Western Antique Airplane and Automobile Museum fly-in at Ken Jernstedt Airfield/Hood River Airport (4S2) in Hood River, Oregon. 

Paulson made a brief stop at Ed Carlson Memorial Field/South Lewis County Airport (KTDO) in Toledo, Washington, before continuing south toward Hood River as part of a flight of three Stearman aircraft making the journey together. They departed KTDO just before noon.

According to preliminary ADS-B data, the Kaydet was observed at an altitude of 1,800 feet on a southerly heading at 12:16 p.m. PDT. Approximately 15 minutes later, it turned toward the east and began a gradual climb, reaching an altitude of 2,700 feet.

During the flight, however, Paulson broke away from the three-plane formation, according to WSDOT. The other two aircraft made it to the destination, and when Paulson’s Kaydet did not arrive within an hour and a half, they reported the aircraft missing. WSDOT got the call at 3:05 p.m. and immediately launched a search.

The ADS-B report of the missing Kaydet showed the aircraft reaching an altitude of 2,600 feet with a ground speed of 43 knots. The aircraft continued to climb and the ground speed diminished until it reached an altitude of 3,000 feet and 43 knots before it began a rapid descent.

According to map data, the elevation of the terrain in the area where the last ADS-B readouts were received was between 2,500 and 3,000 feet msl.

Using cell phone and radar forensics, authorities determined the aircraft’s flight path ended around 1 p.m. in a location approximately 12 miles northwest of Stevenson, Washington. The wreckage was found in rugged terrain in the Gifford Pinchot National Forest. There was no post-crash fire.

“The U.S. Coast Guard out of Astoria [Oregon] had a rescue helicopter and crew, as well as Skamania County ground search-and-rescue teams, located the crash site, where they were able to hear a man’s voice,” WSDOT said. “The plane and its occupants were discovered at 6:20 p.m. in the forest’s trees, down a steep ravine.”

Paulson was transported to Portland, Oregon for medical treatment, according to the Skamania County Sheriff’s Office.

Agencies assisting in the search included Skamania County Search and Rescue, U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, U.S. Coast Guard Air Station Astoria, National Civil Air Patrol Radar and Cell Phone Forensics Teams, Washington Air Search and Rescue, and WSDOT personnel.

According to FAA records, Paulson holds an airline transport certificate and multiple type ratings, along with a valid medical certificate.

The FAA, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and Skamania County Sheriff’s Office are investigating the accident.

Meanwhile, the WAAAM fly-in over the weekend took on a bit of a somber tone as pilots talked about the accident, along with wildfire smoke in the area. Some pilots said the smoke had been so thick to the south that they had turned back.

Pilots at the WAAAM fly-in honored Kelly on Sunday with a flight of four Stearmans over the airfield in the missing man formation.

The post Stearman Crash En Route to Fly-In Leaves 1 Dead appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The aircraft’s pilot, a passenger, and a person on the ground were killed when the airplane crashed into a densely packed community of townhomes located southwest of Portland-Troutdale Airport (KTTD). 

Those on board the aircraft were identified as pilot Michael Busher, 73, of Beavercreek, Oregon, and flight instructor Jacqueline Whitford, 79, of Glendale, Arizona.

According to preliminary information, the twin-engine aircraft took off from Runway 25 at KTTD around 10:20 a.m. PDT on what has been described by investigators as a post-maintenance flight.

According to NBC affiliate KGW-TV, the pilot contacted the control tower and requested permission to do a few laps in the pattern.

However, subsequent conversations between the pilot and the tower revealed there was confusion over what the pilot wanted to do, as he had not taken off. A few minutes later after takeoff, the controller asked the pilot his intentions, noting he had violated an altitude restriction by climbing to 1,700 feet when he was assigned 1,200 feet. The altitude restriction was in place to avoid a conflict with traffic from nearby Portland International Airport (KPDX).

The pilot reported he was having “controllability issues.” The controller cleared the pilot  to return to Portland-Troutdale and land on any runway. A woman’s voice is then heard on the frequency stating the C-421C “would try.”

Security camera footage shows the airplane in a left wing low attitude, its left wing slicing through power lines. 

The crash ignited a large fire, which destroyed three townhomes and damaged at least two others. The fire was fierce, and authorities called a total of five alarms because the intensity of the blaze and temperatures in the 90s were taking a toll on fire fighters.

The crash knocked out power to approximately 9,500 homes for several hours.

Local media outlets identified the victim on the ground as 75-year-old Barbara MacDonald. She was sleeping on the second floor of her home at the time of the crash.

The post NTSB Launches Probe After Cessna Crashes Into Townhomes appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The 58-year-old pilot had about 7,000 hours of flight time, built up as a respected Marine Corps F/A-18 fighter pilot and United Airlines first officer. That day, he was solo in a 1996 Extra EA-300L single-engine unlimited competition aerobatic airplane. The strong machine was working as expected. In the wording of the NTSB, “postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.” Weather wasn’t a factor either, the sun coming up on a glorious Nevada morning. No clouds, no wind, visibility unlimited. At 8 a.m., it was already a dry-heat 90 degrees Fahrenheit.

Taking off from the Henderson Executive Airport (KHND), the pilot flew a straight track over the desert for about 9 miles. The NTSB says he reached a maximum altitude of about 4,244 feet msl. By combining ATS-B data, several eyewitness accounts, and video recordings, we know exactly what happened next.

The pilot flew into a gap between ridgelines and performed a series of rapid climbs, turns, and descents. It was an astonishing display of exciting high-G aerobatics at low altitude through a rocky valley. Wingovers becoming hammerhead turns. Airspeed rapidly swinging back and forth between 60 and 160 knots. Three reversals were recorded, with climb and descent rates of over 10,000 feet per minute. At times, the airplane was less than 200 feet above ground level.

The last ADS-B flight data point has the airplane at about 2,519 feet msl with a groundspeed of only 48 knots. Two witnesses observed the Extra pull up in a climb, then enter a spin toward the ground. In one video, the airplane goes temporarily out of view behind a ridgeline. It’s then seen in a steep nose-down descent with rotation. The airplane crashed into the desert at an elevation of 2,050 feet msl. The wreckage displayed physical evidence that the aircraft was still spinning on impact. The Clark County medical examiner determined the cause of death was “multiple blunt force injuries.”

The NTSB is clear on the probable cause. During aerobatics, at low speed, the pilot exceeded the wing’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin. That’s the physics. 

In addition, because the aerobatics were conducted well below the FAR-prescribed 1,500-feet minimum altitude above the ground, he was too low to recover control. That’s the regulatory safeguard.

There was one other thing: “Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s use of methamphetamine.”

The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute forensic toxicology analysis revealed high levels of methamphetamine, its metabolite amphetamine, phenylpropanolamine, and pseudoephedrine. The latter two are apparently unreacted precursors, which can be present when meth is illegally manufactured from decongestants. Needless to say, using any amount of street meth is disqualifying for FAA aeromedical certification. Among its many other effects, methamphetamine impairs judgment, increases impulsivity, and increases risk-taking.

Physics can explain the accident, but so can psychology. There’s more to the accident pilot than was in the NTSB report. 

As a kid, he enjoyed watching airliners take off and land at Chicago O’Hare International Airport (KORD), wishing he could someday fly one. A Marine Corps recruiter at Hastings College in Nebraska jump-started his career by enrolling him in Officer Candidates School with an aviation track. After earning his wings, he was assigned the F/A-18 Hornet and went to war, flying combat missions in Desert Storm.

With hostilities over, the pilot transferred to a part-time reserve unit and joined United Airlines, flying out of O’Hare. He was living his dream. Then 9/11 happened, and he was deployed to a second war, this one in Iraq. He made it to 20 years of service, retiring from the Corps as a decorated lieutenant colonel. But some experiences had left scars.

He isolated himself from family, friends, even fellow Marines. A business venture failed. He was frustrated, down, dark. Then, the fighter rose again, becoming increasingly active in several veteran associations and PTSD groups. Impressed with the results other Marines and psychiatrists were having using skydiving or scuba diving as a therapy for PTSD, he started a company offering adrenaline therapy. With utility task vehicles and Humvees, he organized stress relief and mental health healing off-road desert trips for vets.

The latest venture was the Extra 300. On YouTube he described his mission “to share God’s creation from His view, providing an experience of a lifetime. Our ancestors dreamed of breaking free from gravity and soaring where eagles dared … escape the mundane, pandemic riddled world by taking flight in one of the most maneuverable airplanes ever manufactured.” The July 3 flight was a planned photo shoot for his Adrenaline Therapy LLC.

After the accident, we can understand the stall/spin aerodynamics. We can make sense of minimum altitude regulations that give us time and space to recover control. These are breaking points we can analyze. But to make sense of PTSD, to understand a hedonic urge to fly close to danger, that might require a different kind of analysis.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on Plane & Pilot.

The post After the Accident: Adrenaline Therapy appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

According to the NTSB report, the accident was caused, in part, by inadequate inspection procedures by the operator, Marpat Aviation, and a lack of FAA oversight. All six occupants died when the UH-1B “Huey” hit power lines during an attempted forced landing following a loss of engine power.

The accident flight was the last scheduled passenger trip of the second day of the annual Huey Reunion at Logan County Airport (6L4). The helicopter was licensed in 2014 under the experimental exhibition category, and members of the public could pay to go for rides during the event.

The report said the FAA provided “basically no oversight” of Marpat’s maintenance operations. The NTSB found that Marpat likely would have discovered the fatigue cracks in the engine component that caused the power loss if it had conducted more comprehensive inspections.

The NTSB also wrote that the FAA “lacked guidance” for inspectors to provide routine surveillance of aircraft operators with experimental airworthiness certificates, such as the one held for the UH-1B involved in the accident.

The investigative agency noted that the FAA had revised its maintenance standards for ex-military aircraft with experimental airworthiness certificates in 2015, but the aircraft in question was not required to meet the newer standards based on the date of its certification.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

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